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I. INTRODUCTION 
Terrorist activities are not of recent origin on the international plane. 
They have been around since the beginning of humanity. Although 
international law may not be accused of addressing the issue of terrorism 
with levity, it was after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States that 
the international community’s efforts toward fighting terrorism garnered 
more strength and attention.  
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The debatable critical question is whether terrorism under international 
law should be studied and treated as a specific subject in developing the 
legal norms and principles for its fight and regulation, or whether 
terrorism should be fought and regulated based on the already existing 
relevant international legal norms and principles. We favor the later 
approach. Terrorism like piracy, torture, genocide etc. should be 
examined within the context of the already existing framework of 
international law, because it does not, as of the present time, have clear 
legal norms. Terrorism has become one of the top ranking problems 
threatening the peace and stability of the international community and 
challenging international law at the present time.  While the international 
community as a whole has not avoided addressing the challenges of this 
anathema, a lot still needs to be done to adequately combat terrorism. 
More cooperation among States and international organizations is a sine 
qua non in this direction. One major impediment to the efforts being 
made to contain terrorism is the inability of the international community 
to adopt a comprehensive and generally acceptable definition of 
terrorism that would capture its constitutive elements. 
The objectives of this paper are:  to discuss the genesis of the doctrine of 
war, use of force, difficulties associated with the definition of terrorism, 
causes of terrorism, terrorism during both armed conflict and peace time; 
the United Nations efforts in dealing with the definition of terrorism; the 
legal responsibility for acts of terrorism; and attempt to outline how best 
to cure the underlying problem and not just the symptoms. Hopefully 
these efforts will help in identifying the best ways through which the 
fight against terrorism may be won. 
II. THE JUST WAR DOCTRINE 
The origin of the doctrine of just war can be traced to the Greeks and 
Romans. Greek philosophers, who had striven to bring some reason, 
order, and essence to their society tried to justify war on moral, religious, 
and legal grounds.1  The Roman writer, Cicero, characterized war as if it 
were waged to recover lost goods.2 Just war doctrine was earlier 
influenced by the Church's view of natural law. Even though the Romans 
generally believed that war was an aspect of nature and was dictated by 
the natural order to which man had no control, they felt that the only 
justification for war was an injury accompanied by lack of atonement on 
  
 1. See Frederick Russell, The Just War Theory in the Middle Ages, 1 (Cambridge University 
Press, 1975) 
 2. Id. at 5. 
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the part of the wrongdoer.3  Among the non-Christian societies, there 
were thoughts about the need for rules that would reduce the negative 
effects of war.4  The authority of the Church merged with the authority of 
the State, which led to a Christian pacifism5 that was later displaced by 
St. Augustine's view of natural law. 
St. Augustine, in his natural law oriented way of thinking, espoused a 
just war theory under which war could not only be just, but obligatory 
under certain conditions.6  In his analysis of the just war doctrine, St. 
Augustine identified the core attribute of a just war, namely, that it must 
be fought in order to promote or preserve peace, to punish the evil doer, 
or to recover possessions wrongfully taken.7  He propagated war as a last 
resort, and reasoned that a just war must be fought by a sovereign 
authority. 
Following St. Augustine was St. Thomas Aquinas, another philosopher 
who discussed the just war theory from a natural law prism. He 
elaborated on the work of his predecessor, St. Augustine. In answering 
the question of “whether it is always sinful to wage war”8 in the negative, 
St. Thomas Aquinas identified three conditions that a just war should 
meet: proper authority, just cause, and rightful intention.9  He was in 
agreement with St. Augustine that the authority to fight a just war resided 
with a sovereign; such war must have been triggered by a just cause, 
supported by the right intention of those waging the war.10  The intention 
referred to here is the advancement of good or the avoidance of evil.11  St. 
  
 3. See Von Elbe, “The Evolution of the Concept of Just War in International Law,” 33 
A.J.I.L. 665, 666 (1939). 
 4. See Maj. Jeffrey F. Addicott & Maj. William A. Hudson, Jnr., “The Twenty -Fifth 
Anniversary of My Lai: A Time to Inculcate the Lessons”, 139 Mil. L. Rev. 176-177 (1993). 
 5. See Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self Defense,  60, 3rd ed. (2001). Under this 
philosophy, there was in existence, a City of God, in which God Himself ordained wars against evil. 
See Von Elbe, supra, 668. 
 6. He noted that: “ Just wars are usually defined as those which avenge injuries, when the 
nation or city against which war-like action is to be directed has neglected either to punish wrongs 
committed by its own citizens, or to restore what has been unjustly taken by it. Further, that kind of 
war is undoubtedly just which God Himself ordains.” See Mark Janis, An Introduction to 
International Law, 169, 3rd ed. (1999). 
 7. Thus, “[P]eace is war's purpose, the scope of all military discipline, and the limit at which 
all just contentions aim”. See St. Augustine, The City of God, (J. Healey trans.), in Basic Texts in 
International Relations 28 (Evan Luard ed., 1992). 
 8. See St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theological, II.2.40, quoted in St Thomas Aquinas on 
Politics and Ethics, 64 ( Paul E. Sigmund, ed. & Trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1988). 
 9. Id., at 64-65. 
 10. See Von Elbe, supra 666; Yoram Dinstein, supra, 62-63. 
 11. The practical implication of this is that a war may be waged by a sovereign authority, and 
with a just cause, yet unlawful where it is fought with a wrong intention. See R.J. Araujo, Anti-
Personnel Mines and Peremptory Norms of International Law: Argument and Catalyst, 30 VAND 
Transnat'l L. 1, 8 (1997). 
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Thomas Aquinas saw the need to punish both the wrongful conduct of 
the wrongdoer as well as his guilty mind and felt that defense of a 
common good was a moral obligation to the extent that inaction in the 
face of a threat to a common good was as sinful as an unwarranted 
attack.12  
An important aspect of St. Thomas Aquinas’s exposition of the just war 
doctrine is his introduction to the concept of “double effect,” wherein he 
explained that every course of action undertaken could produce two 
consequences: the one that is intended and the other that is outside the 
intended consequence.13 Thus, to determine the justness of war, an 
emphasis is placed more on what is intended rather than on the incidental 
consequence.14 War attained some secularization with an increase in the 
European sovereign States that led to a difficulty in categorizing war. 
However, Francisco Suarez and Francisco de Victoria discussed the 
legality of use of force by States15  and identified the basis of just war as a 
necessary to redress and defend against wrong.16   
Other writers carried out further work on just war doctrine. Hugo 
Grotius' idea had a great impact on the doctrine of just war. He had a 
passion for regulated war, which led to him to enunciate the grounds 
upon which just war could be prosecuted, namely: self defense, 
enforcement of rights, reparation of injury, and punishment for wrongs.17  
Grotius went further to identify three classes of legal frameworks: the 
first was the law of nations, which he believed was founded on 
sovereignty; the second was natural law, which was based on nature; and 
the third was Christian moral theology, which he said was based on the 
  
 12. See Frederick Russell, supra, 262. 
 13. See St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics, supra 70-71. 
 14. This approach is objectionable, for instance, when it is applied to the fight against 
terrorism since, according to its tenets, a sovereign state may prosecute a war against another state, 
once there exists in the mind of the sovereign a right intention for so doing, even if there are evil 
consequences resulting from such war. The concept would seem to give support to a situation where 
a state abuses the human rights of individuals in the guise of fighting terrorism. 
 15. See Alfred Verdross & Heribert Franz Koeck, Natural Law: The Tradition of Universal 
Reason and Authority, in The Structure and Process of International Law 17, 19-20 (R. St. J. 
Macdonald &  Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983 ). 
 16. See Francisco de Victoria, De Indis et de Jure Belli, Second Reflection, 429, para 13 
(1696); Francisco Suarez, Selection   from Three Works, De Triplica Virtute Theologica, Fide, Spe, 
et Charitate (1621). Suarez maintained that the only just cause for war was a grave injustice which 
could not be avenged or repaired in any other way. 
 17. See Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, The Dictionary of International Relations, 288 
(1998). 
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New Testament.18  Hugo Grotius's perception of just war theory was not 
limited to theology, but extended to rationalist considerations as well.19 
It would seem that the just war theory lost its relevance following the 
adoption of the UN Charter, and in fact some writers have maintained 
this position.20  However, whether wittingly or unwittingly, reference is 
still made by academics, authors and even political leaders, to the 
doctrine of just war, in their analysis of use of force.21  Thus, the just war 
doctrine has not lost total relevance under the current international law 
regime.  
A. INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE USE OF FORCE 
While it was not so clear in the various international law instruments 
preceding the Charter of the United Nations whether or not the use of 
force by states was prohibited, owing to the fact that those instruments 
seemed to have focused on the regulation of war,22 it became glaring 
upon the coming into effect of the UN Charter that there is a general 
prohibition of the use of force in international law. This is by virtue of 
Article 2(4), which provides that: “All members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” As can be 
seen from that provision, not only is the use of force prohibited, the 
threat of its use is also prohibited. Despite the controversy surrounding 
what categories of actions by State that will amount to use of force under 
Article 2(4) and the varying interpretations given to the provision,23  it is 
  
 18. See Mark Janis, An Introduction to International Law, 162 -167, 3rd ed. (1999). 
 19. See generally Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis, 15, Chapter 1. Grotius dealt so much 
on sovereigns and their obligations in the community of sovereigns, an approach which led to the 
distinction between positivists and naturalists. See Robert Beck et al, eds., International Rules: 
Approaches from International Law and International Relations, 36 (1996). 
 20. See Yoram Dinstein, The Rule of Law in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations: Comments 
on War, 27 HARV J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 877, 879-880 (2004); Interview with Michael Schmitt, 
Charles H. Stockton Prof. Of International Law, US Naval War College, at TJAGLCS, in 
Charlottesville, VA (February 22, 2008). 
 21. See Michael Walzer, Presentation at Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen: War and Death: 
Reflecting on the Meaning of Just War Theory Today (2007); Paul Ramsey, War and Argument 
With Historical Illustrations (Basic Books 2000) (1997); President W. Bush, Remarks on the War on 
Terror at Fort Bragg (June 28, 2005), available at http://thinkprogress.org/2005/06/28/breaking-full-
text-of-bush-speech. 
 22. See, for example, the Covenant of the League of Nations 1919 and the Kellogg- Briand 
Pact 1928. 
 23. See Kelsen, “Collective Security Under International Law,” International Law Studies, US 
Naval War College, 57; 
  Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 110- 113 (1991); the Corfu Channel 
Case ICJ Reports, 1949, 4, 35.  A proposal by Brazil for the inclusion of a prohibition against the 
“use of economic measures” against a state was rejected during the preparation of the UN Charter. 
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incontestable that an armed attack is a manifestation of use of force.24  It 
then follows that a terrorist attack amounts to use of force. The language 
of Article 2(4) is broad enough to cover any type of military action 
against another State, and not only war.25  The prohibition of the use of 
force is not sacrosanct, as it admits two exceptions: the first is the UN 
Security Council authorized action by virtue of Chapter VII; the second 
is the use of force in exercise of the right of self defense under Article 
51.  
III. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND TERRORISM 
International humanitarian law has its foundation in the notion that every 
individual is entitled to some cognizable rights both in times of peace 
and war.26  It is essentially the law of war between States.27 International 
humanitarian laws exists in two categories: jus ad bellum which deals 
with the rules that govern situations when it is permissible to attack, and 
jus in bello which deals with the rules that govern behavior in situations 
of war.28  The problem that will engage the following section of this part 
is whether international humanitarian law, especially jus in bello, is 
applicable to terrorism. For this purpose, we would identify terrorist 
activities under two regimes: terrorism during an armed conflict and 
terrorism in peacetime.  
A. TERRORISM DURING ARMED CONFLICT 
Despite the obvious difficulty in adopting a generally acceptable 
definition of terrorism,29 it will not be out of place to say that terrorism is 
an instrument of warfare. It then follows that where terrorist acts are 
employed as an armed conflict strategy, then international humanitarian 
law or the law of armed conflict will apply, especially where the 
terrorism is committed on the territory of a party to the armed conflict.30  
The notion of international armed conflict presupposes the existence of a 
  
See 6 Docs. Of the U.N. Conf. on Int’l Org. 335; Goodrich Hambro and Simons, Charter of the 
United Nations, 49, 3rd ed. (1969). 
 24. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States) 1986 I.C.J. 14 103-123. 
 25. See Murphy, “Terrorism and the Concept of Armed Attack in Article 51 of the UN 
Charter,” 43 HARV INT'L L. J. 41, 42. 
 26. See U. O. Umozurike, Introduction to International Law, 212 (Spectrum Books Limited, 
Ibadan, 2005). 
 27. See generally Pictet, Humanitarian Law and the Protection of War Victims (1976). 
 28. See Dan Belz, “Is International Humanitarian Law Lapsing into Irrelevance in the War on 
International Terror?” 7 THEORILAW 97, 100 (2006). 
 29. This paper is yet to attempt a definition of terrorism. This is dedicated to part II. 
 30. See H.P. Gasser, “Acts of Terrorism and International Humanitarian Law,” 84 Int'l Review 
of the Red Cross, 547-570, at556 (2002). 
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state of belligerency between two states. There has been a lingering 
debate as to what will be the position, or rather, the characterization, 
when one of the parties to the armed conflict is not a state. Where acts of 
terrorism are used to initiate hostilities, whether or not the methods are 
lawful, such acts would be in violation of jus ad bellum if they are 
attributable to a state using the traditional methods of attribution.31  It has 
been thought that a terrorist group that is not subject to the control of any 
State cannot be in violation of jus ad bellum and its activities do not 
amount to a use of force that can trigger the exercise of the right to self 
defense.32  This view has not escaped opposition.33  Where terrorism is 
part of an on-going armed conflict, the aspect of international 
humanitarian law that will apply to it is jus in bello.34 The earlier 
codification of international humanitarian law was done at the Hague 
Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, and later by the four Geneva 
Conventions and their Additional Protocols of 1977.35   
A determination of whether or not international humanitarian law or the 
law of armed conflict applies to terrorism taking place in the course of an 
armed conflict can be made by examining some of the provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols. Article 33 of the 
Geneva Convention I provides, “no protected person may be punished 
for an offense [sic] he or she has not personally committed. Collective 
penalties, and likewise all measures of intimidation or terrorism are 
  
 31. See Draft Article 8 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, in United Nations International Law Commission, Report on the Work of its Fifty-
Third Session (23 April- 1 June and 2 July- 10 August 2001) UN Doc A/56/10 (Suppl.), 1 Oct. 2001, 
at 29; Nicaragua case, supra, 115 
 32. See Randelz Hofer, “Article 51,” in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary, 2nd  ed. (Oxford, OUP, 2002). 
 33. See C. Greenwood, “War Terrorism and International Law,” 56 Current Legal Problems, 
515 (2003). 
 34. Although jus ad bellum and jus in bello are distinct aspects of general international 
humanitarian law, there is a close relationship between them, in that an armed attack which amounts 
to use of force, which is governed by jus ad bellum often results in armed conflict, which is 
regulated by jus in bello. 
 35. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (Hereinafter Geneva 
Convention No. I); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, 
and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 
85 (Hereinafter Geneva Convention No. II); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (Hereinafter Geneva Convention 
No. III); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Hereinafter Geneva Convention No. IV); Additional Protocol 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 
3 (Hereinafter Protocol I); Additional Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (Hereinafter Protocol II); 
Additional Protocol Relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem, December 8, 
2005, 2404 U.N.T.S (Hereinafter Protocol III). 
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prohibited. Pillage is prohibited. Reprisals against protected persons and 
their property are prohibited.”  
Article 51(2) of Protocol I contains the following provision, “The 
civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be 
the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of 
which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.”  
Article 4(2) of Protocol II provides, “Without prejudice to the generality 
of the foregoing, the following acts against the persons referred to in 
Paragraph 1 are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place 
whatsoever. 
(d) Acts of terrorism 
(h) Threats to commit any of the following acts.”  
Article 13(2) of Protocol II provides, “The civilian population as such, as 
well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or 
threats of violence the purpose of which is to spread terror among the 
civilian population are prohibited.”  
One striking difficulty from a reading of the above provisions, as they 
relate to terrorism during an armed conflict, is that the protection from 
terrorist acts granted to the civilian population is dependent on whether 
or not those acts are primarily intended to terrorize the civilians. In other 
words, where combatants carry out some military actions close to the 
neighborhood of the civilian population, with any purpose other than to 
terrorize the civilians in the course of a war, the afore-stated provisions 
will not apply and the combatants will not be in breach of the provisions. 
This, in effect, is to say that the application of the provisions is a function 
of the intention or objective of the military in carrying out the supposedly 
terrorist acts in question, and is independent of the consequences of the 
acts on the civilian population.36  This may leave the military with much 
discretion to determine the purpose of its action taken during armed 
conflict. The protection from terrorism during an armed conflict offered 
by international humanitarian law as contained in the Geneva 
Conventions and their Additional Protocols applies only to protected 
persons, that is, civilians. It would appear that unprivileged combatants 
who are actively engaged in an armed conflict cannot benefit from this 
protection. International humanitarian law generally applies to 
  
 36. This takes us back to the propositions of St. Thomas Aquinas on the doctrine of just war, 
precisely his concept of “double-effect.” 
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international armed conflicts, but to some extent it has relevance to non-
international armed conflicts pertaining to national liberation and self 
determination.37  Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions calls 
for minimal humanitarian considerations in cases of armed conflict not of 
international character. However, acts of violence committed by private 
persons or groups, which are considered terrorist acts, internal 
disturbances and tensions which are sporadic in character and other acts 
of similar nature, are outside the purview of international humanitarian 
law.38 
It is arguable, and in fact was argued by the United States, that at the 
time they occurred, the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001 against the 
United States could not be classified as an armed conflict and so cannot 
be placed within the jus in bello regulation.39  However, those acts fit into 
the sphere of jus ad bellum, as they amounted to an armed attack, giving 
rise to the exercise of the right of self defense by the United States. 
Ultimately, this tragic event in history marked the beginning of hostilities 
between the United States and Afghanistan, which had provided shelter 
for Al Qaeda. Thus, at that point, the law of armed conflict became 
applicable to the conflict.  
Notably, in spite of what has been stated so far, there is no general 
agreement as to the propriety and extent of the application of the law of 
armed conflict to terrorism in international law. One school of thought 
argues that the scope of the law of armed conflict as it is presently, is 
inadequate to regulate modern terrorism. It is therefore suggested by the 
proponents of this view that the law of armed conflict be adjusted for it 
to be able to grapple with the challenges of contemporary terrorism.40  
Another contrary school of thought maintains that the rules of 
international humanitarian law are adequate and wide enough to regulate 
the gamut of terrorist activities. The representatives of this view express 
concern over any review of the law of armed conflict on the basis of 
combating terrorism, as that may have some unpleasant effects on human 
  
 37. See Article 14 of Protocol II. 
 38. See Article 2 of Protocol II; Pan American World Airways v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 
(1974) 505 F. 2d 299; Green, “Terrorism and Armed Conflict: The Plea and the Verdict,” 19 Israel 
Y.B.H.R. 131 (1989). 
 39. See Hamdan v Rumsfield, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), where the United States Supreme Court 
rejected this argument. 
 40. See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, “War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the 
Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror,” 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 675, 755-760; Roy S. Schondorf, 
Extra-State Armed Conflicts: Is There Need for a New Legal Regime?, 37 N.Y.U.J. Int'l Law & Pol. 
1 (2004); Robert  Sloane, Prologue to a Voluntarist War Convention, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 443 (2007-
2008). 
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rights.41  There seems to be yet another view that queries the basis for the 
application of the law of armed conflict to current terrorism, arguing that 
terrorist acts lack the character of military threat and therefore do not 
merit the application of the law of armed conflict at all.42   
While not testing the veracity of these positions, it should be noted that 
such debate as engaged by writers and commentators may contribute 
little or nothing to addressing the current problem of terrorism. Whether 
or not terrorism is viewed from the context of armed conflicts or from a 
combination of perspectives, one thing appears clear: the body of 
international law rules currently in place seem adequate to tackle the 
incidence of terrorism, so long as there are concerted efforts and 
cooperation among the subjects, as well as objects, of international law.  
B. TERRORISM IN PEACETIME 
There is always a purpose for engaging in armed conflicts. Perhaps it is 
in recognition of this fact that war is not absolutely prohibited in 
international law. Instead, rules have been put in place to regulate 
conduct in wartime. While the employment of terrorism in armed 
conflict situations is allowed as a warfare strategy, except in some 
circumstances, like its use on the civilian population, the same assertion 
cannot be made concerning acts of terrorism committed during 
peacetime. Professor Sompong Sucharitkul contends that peacetime 
terrorism, being an internationally organized crime, isolates itself from 
other crimes found in a single legal criminal system, and therefore should 
be treated separately from sporadic, individual attacks.43   
Peacetime terrorism has some problematic implications on international 
humanitarian law. Clearly, the Geneva Conventions and their Additional 
Protocols apply to armed conflicts but not to “situations of internal 
disturbances and tensions such as riots and isolated and sporadic acts of 
violence.”44  A conspicuous element of peacetime terrorism lies in the 
fact that it is targeted at a community of States.  In the midst of the 
limited application of international humanitarian law to armed conflict 
situations, an inference could be drawn that terrorism occurring outside 
  
 41. See Gabor Rona, “Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law: Challenges from 
the War on Terror,” 27 Fletcher F. World Aff. 55, 57 (2003). 
 42. See Mattew C. Waxman, The Structure of Terrorism Threats and the Laws of War, 20 
DUKEJCIL 429, 430-431. 
 43. See Sompong Sucharitkul, “Applicable Law in International Terrorist Threats and Attacks 
and the Consequences of Error in Personam,” 11 Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L. 107, 111 (2005). 
 44. See Motley, Terrorist Warfare: Formidable Challenges, 9 Fletcher F. 295, 297 (1985). 
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war situations is regulated by anti-terrorism conventions,45 supplemented 
by international criminal law.   
Some aspects of humanitarian law do apply to armed conflicts as well as 
to peacetime.46 A suggestion has been made to treat those categories of 
terrorism as the “peacetime” equivalent of war crimes.47  However, this 
approach, if adhered to, may not have good implications. For example, 
because it entails the application of the law of armed conflict to outside-
war-theater-terrorism, it will confer some entitlements on terrorists, such 
as the status of prisoners of war. In addition, it would increase the 
incidence of insurrection, treating insurgents as combatants, rather than 
as common criminals.48  
IV. DEFINING TERRORISM 
The problem with a meaningful discussion of international law of 
terrorism stems from the difficulty of a proper examination of the 
phenomenon itself.  It is a mistake to suppose that merely by describing a 
group or entity as terrorist, one is formulating its capacity in law.  The 
conventional approach to solving a problem has been to first understand 
its nature, which includes its definition. This approach should equally 
apply to terrorism. Unfortunately, terrorism in international law has no 
generally acceptable definition, because efforts at defining terrorism 
have fallen short of adopting a definition that is generally acceptable to 
  
 45. See, for example, International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 
TIAS 11081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 
Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; Convention and 
Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 
1988, I.M.O. Doc. SVA/CON/15; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at 
Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for Suppression  of 
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 1589 U.N.T.S. 474; Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including 
Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; Convention on the Safety of 
United Nations and Associated Personnel, Dec. 9, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 482; International Convention for 
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, 2149 U.N.T.S. 284; Convention on the 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Mar. 3, 1980, 1456 U.N.T.S. 124; International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 39 I.L.M. 270, 2178 U.N.T.S. 228. 
 46. See, for example, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, 1948, Article 1. 
 47. See Sing v Bihar, 2004 SOL Case No. 264, April 2, 2004, para. 16, available at 
htt://supremecourtonline.com (where the court affirmed a conviction under the Indian Terrorist and 
Disruptive Activities Act 1987 of some individuals who, while heavily armed, attacked some police 
officers. See also M.P. Sharf “International Law Weekend Proceedings: Defining Terrorism as the 
Peacetime Equivalent of War Crimes: A Case of Too Much Convergence Between International 
Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law?” 7 ILSA Journal of Int'l. & Comp. Law 391, 
398 (2002). 
 48. See Michael Scharf, “Defining Terrorism as the Peacetime Equivalent of War Crimes: 
Problems and Prospects,” 36 CWRJIL 359, 372-373 (2004). 
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the international community. It is ironic that a concept, or rather, a 
problem that has a large implication in international security is met with 
this fate. The general feeling among scholars seems to be that the task of 
evolving and adopting a definition of terrorism acceptable to 
international law is not achievable. Thus, so many expressions,49 funny as 
they may be, have been crafted by writers and commentators to reflect 
the impossibility of reaching an agreed to definition of terrorism.  
Notwithstanding the absence of a comprehensive definition of terrorism, 
it would be naive and destructive to conclude that terrorism lacks a core 
meaning.50 The importance of a universally acceptable definition of 
terrorism cannot be overemphasized, as such definition would enhance 
intelligence sharing and international cooperation, and bring harmony 
and unity of purpose in the fight against terrorism.51  The search for a 
legal definition of terrorism has led some states to adopt as criminal, acts 
that do not reveal the intent of the “culprit” to produce a state of terror, 
and in some situations, those definitions are unnecessarily broad.52 
Professor Christopher Blacksley defines terrorism as:  
...violence committed by any means; causing death, great bodily 
harm, or serious property damage; to innocent individuals; with 
the intent to cause those consequences or with wanton disregard 
for those consequences; and for the purpose of coercing or 
intimidating some specific group, or government, or otherwise to 
gain some perceived political, military, religious, or other 
philosophical benefit.53   
This definition is neutral and includes terrorism by both State and non-
State actors. It deviates from the definitions often found in the domestic 
  
 49. For example: “The search for a legal definition of terrorism in some way resembles the 
quest for the Holy Grail: periodically, eager souls set out, full of purpose, energy, and self 
confidence, to succeed where so many others before have tried and failed.” See Geoffrey Levitt, “Is 
“Terrorism” Worth Defining?” 13 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 97, 97 (1986); “What looks, smells, and kills 
like terrorism, is terrorism.” See Sir Jeremy Greenstock, KCMG Permanent Representative of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, General Assembly Debate on Terrorism, 1 
Oct., 2001 (2001). http://www.un.org/terrorism/statements/UKE.html; Aaron Notebom, “Terrorism: 
I Know It When I See It,” 81 OR.L. REV. 553, 559 (2002). 
 50. See Oscar Schacter, “The Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases,” 11 
HOUS. J. INT'L L. 309, 309 (1989). 
 51. See Jacqueline Ann Carberry, “Terrorism: A Global Phenomenon Mandating a Unified 
International Response,” 6 IND J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 685, 711 (1999). 
 52. See Jordan Paust, “An Introduction to and Commentary on Terrorism and the Law,” 19 
Conn.L.Rev. 697, 703-705 (1987); Naomi Norberg, supra, 32-34. 
 53. See Christopher Blakesley, Terror and Anti-Terrorism: A Normative and Practical 
Assessment, 31 (2006). 
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laws of States.54  Terrorism, according to Dinstein, constitutes “acts of 
violence committed to instill fear (to terrorize) [sic] a state or a social 
group, where the victims are chosen either at random or because of mere 
association with a target entity.”55 
Terrorism seems to have been first used as a legal term in 1931 at the 
Third Conference for the Unification of Penal Law at Brussels, where it 
was defined as  
...international use of means capable of producing a common 
danger that represents an act of terrorism on the part of anyone 
making use of crimes against life, property or physical integrity 
of persons, or directed against private or state property, with the 
purpose of expressing or executing political or social ideas...56  
By including the word “terrorism” in the definition of the concept being 
defined, begs the question, what is terrorism?  
There have been attempts, both by the UN and international treaties to 
make provisions on terrorism. In 1937, the League of Nations did 
produce a treaty – the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Terrorism – following the assassination of King Alexander I of 
Yugoslavia and the French Foreign Minister in October 1934.57  The 
Convention defined terrorism as “all criminal acts directed against a state 
and intended and calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of 
particular persons or a group of persons or the general public.”58  This 
definition, although broad, contemplated terrorism committed by non-
state actors and wittingly or unwittingly avoided inclusion of terrorism 
by State actors. Unfortunately, and perhaps not surprisingly, the 1937 
Convention never entered into force, because only a few States signed it, 
with only India ratifying it because of its broad definition of terrorism.59  
The early attempts to define terrorism through the instrumentality of 
treaties was followed by UN conventions, whose provisions relate to 
  
 54. See, for example, India's Prevention of Terrorism Act, No. 15 of 2002; India Code (2002); 
El Salvador's Special Law Against Acts of Terrorism, Article 5. 
 55. See Yoram Dinstein, “Humanitarian Law on the Conflict in Afghanistan,” 96 AM. SOC'Y 
OF INT'L L. PROC., 23, 23 (2002). 
 56. See Bogdan Zlataric, History of International Terrorism and Its Legal Control, in 
International Terrorism and Political Crimes (M.Cherif Bassiouni ed.) 474, 479. 
 57. See V.S. Mani, “International Terrorism: Is a Definition Possible?” 18 INDIAN J. INT'L 
L. 206, 208 (1978). 
 58. See Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, League of Nations Doc. 
546(1). M.383.1937.V (1938) (The 1937 Convention). 
 59. See J.G. Starke, “The Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism,” 19 
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 214,215 (1938). 
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only specific acts of terrorism that occur in specific circumstances. The 
conventions therefore have failed to give a general definition of 
terrorism.  
Other UN treaties that can provide insight into a definition of terrorism 
include conventions concerning nuclear material60 and plastic 
explosives.61 In 1997, the UN General Assembly adopted the 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings. 
Without defining terrorism, Article 2 of the Convention provides that for 
the purposes of the Convention, a person is guilty of an offense if that 
person 
unlawfully and intentionally delivers, places, discharges or 
detonates an explosive, or other lethal devices in, into or against 
a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public 
transportation system or an infrastructure facility with the intent 
to cause death or serious bodily injury or with the intent to cause 
excessive destruction of such a place, facility or system, where 
such destruction results in or is likely to result in, major 
economic loss.62  
In 1999, another convention was adopted by the General Assembly – the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism. Pursuant to its provisions, it is doubtful that the Convention 
gave a clear definition of terrorism.63  
The United Nations has equally resorted to declarations and resolutions 
in its efforts to provide a definition of terrorism. Accordingly, in 1994, 
the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism,64 the applicable provision of which states,  
  
 60. See Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, March 3, 1980, T.I.A.S. 
No 11,080, 1456 U.N.T.S. 101. 
 61. See Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, March 
1, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-8, 30 I.L.M. 726. 
 62. See International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Jan. 9, 1998, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 106-6, 37 I.L.M. 251. 
 63. The Convention makes reference to “ An act which constitutes an offense within the scope 
of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex, or ; … any other act intended to cause 
death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the 
hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to 
intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to 
abstain from doing any act.” See G.A. Res. 109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, Agenda Item 
160, 3, 25, U.N. Doc. A/54/109 (1999). 
 64. G.A. Res. 49/60, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/49/743 (1994). 
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Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror 
in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for 
political purposes are in any circumstances unjustifiable, 
whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, 
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may 
be invoked to justify them. 
In response to the 9/11 attacks on the United States, the General 
Assembly set up a working group to fashion a comprehensive convention 
on international terrorism. In its deliberations, the group proposed a 
general definition of terrorism.65 However, this definition could not be 
adopted as a result of Malaysia's insistence on adding some provisions to 
the definition to the effect of, “peoples’ struggle including armed 
struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, and 
hegemony, aimed at liberation and self determination in accordance with 
the principles of international law shall not be considered a terrorist 
crime.”66   This insistence was responsible for the failure of the project.  
Whatever definition is ascribed to terrorism, it is my position that 
terrorism has a core meaning. It is this core meaning that manifests in the 
objective elements shared by most, if not all, terrorist acts. First, the 
purpose of a terrorist act is to achieve an outcome of terror on its target, 
so the mens rea of terrorism as an act is the creation of terror.67 A 
definition of terrorism must therefore contain this terror element for it to 
be objective. Such a definition would exclude acts that are carried out 
merely to threaten, intimidate, frighten, coerce, or for other such 
purposes that are less serious, which do not imply a motive of terror.68  
Second, terrorism is not committed only by State actors; rather, it is an 
act that is perpetrated by non-State actors as well. Non-State actors 
include private persons and groups, such as insurgents. Third, another 
objective element of a terrorist act is that it is aimed at achieving some 
  
 65. The proposed definition was that: “[Terrorism is an act] intended to cause death or serious 
bodily injury to any person; or serious damage to a State or government facility, a public 
transportation system, communication system or infrastructure facility... when the purpose of such 
act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an 
international organization to do or abstain from doing an act.” See Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism: Report of the Working Group, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 55th Sess., Agenda 
Item 164, at 39, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/55/L.2 (2000). 
 66. See Surya P. Subedi, The U.N. Response to International Terrorism in the Aftermath of the 
Terrorist Attacks in America and the Problem of the Definition of Terrorism in International Law, 4 
INT'L LAW F. DU DROIT INT'L 159, 163 (2002). 
 67. This is without prejudice to the fact that terrorism can be a war strategy, for example 
during an armed conflict. Except in those circumstances where its use is not permitted, the use of 
terrorism by combatants during an armed conflict is not prohibited.  
 68. See International Criminal Law, 842 (Jordan J. Paust et al  eds., 3rd ed., 2007). 
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political, military, ideological, religious, ethnic, or other goals.69 A 
definition of terrorism that is bereft of these elements will not be 
sufficient. 
Thus, this paper seeks to assert that terrorism is any act or conduct borne 
out of political, religious, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, 
religious or any other motive whatsoever or no motive at all, intended to 
cause, or capable of causing, terror in, or death or serious bodily injury 
on, any person, or serious damage to a State or government facility or 
any public infrastructure facility whatsoever, or intended to intimidate or 
capable of intimidating a population or part of a population,  or to 
compel, or capable of compelling, a government or a branch of 
government or an international organization to do or refrain from doing 
an act.  
A. CAUSES OF TERRORISM  
Terrorism is caused by a number of factors. The first factor that is often 
linked to terrorism is politics. Dissatisfaction with government policies, 
or even with a particular regime can lead to terrorism. Where members 
of a group feel the government in power is insensitive to their welfare 
and that they have exhausted all other avenues to attract the attention of 
that regime to their plight, a resort could be made to terrorism as a way 
of driving home their grievances. The issue of marginalization, where a 
minority group feels it is being excluded from the scheme of 
administration plays itself out in this regard. Many, if not all, attempts at 
defining terrorism contain this political element. Lack of, or rather, 
denial of, political participation, and concrete grievances constitute a 
major factor that leads to the commission of terrorist acts.70  But, it has 
been argued that the root causes of terrorism should be disregarded in 
consideration of the ways to combat terrorism.71 This view is rather 
objectionable.  
Closely connected to the issue of politics are economic factors. The 
prevalence of poverty and lack of development are other factors 
contributing to terrorism. Thus, structured inequalities within countries 
have been identified as breeding grounds for violent political movements 
  
 69. See Beth Van Schaack, “Finding the Tort of Terrorism in International Law,” 28 Rev. Lit. 
381, 429 (2008). 
 70. See, generally, Martha Crenshaw, The Causes of Terrorism, 13 Comp. Pol. 379 (1981). 
 71. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works 24-25 (2002). 
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in general and terrorism in particular.72  Social stratification and economic 
deprivation can lead to terrorist acts. A perception of unfairness or 
subordination in economic opportunities triggers terrorism.  
Another aspect of the economic factor is the financing of terrorism. A 
successful terrorist outing has some cost implications. So, terrorists are 
first involved in a cost assessment of their planned activities, only 
proceeding if they are able to secure the necessary financing. Thus, 
terrorism relies on the financial market in order to thrive. This raises the 
issue of terrorism financing through the use of the banking system and 
money transfer, including money laundering. However, it has been noted 
that terror financing is distinguishable from money laundering in the 
sense that while money laundering involves illegal funds, terror 
financing does not necessarily have to do with illegal funds; rather “in 
terror financing,... the actual illegality often occurs only after the actual 
transfer, when the money is ultimately used for funding terrorism.”73  The 
fact remains that there is a relationship between money laundering and 
the financing of terrorism.  
Another cause of terrorism is religion. It has an interaction with the other 
factors, and in extreme cases, such as religious fanaticism, religious 
activists could see as enemies those states or groups of people whom 
they believe are opposed to their religious practices or views. They may 
use acts of terrorism to show their anger towards them. 
V. LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTS OF TERRORISM 
The fact that terrorist acts are prohibited under international law is not 
contestable. This is notwithstanding the lack of unanimity surrounding 
the definition of terrorism and despite the fact that there is no 
comprehensive legislation proscribing acts of terrorism. Instead, what 
exist are bits of instruments outlawing terrorism. However, the collective 
effect of these instruments reveal a consensus that terrorism bodes badly 
for international law. It is a general principle of international law that a 
breach by a State of its international law obligation engages the 
responsibility of that State.74  The obligation of a State extends to the duty 
not to commit acts of terrorism, and where terrorism is linked to a State, 
that State would be responsible for its commission.  
  
 72. See Addressing the Causes of Terrorism, The International Summit on Democracy, 
Terrorism and Security, The Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism, 20 (2005), 
available at http://www.safe-democracy.org/docs/CdM-Series-on-Terrorism-Vol-1.pdf. 
 73. See Amos Guiora, “Using and Abusing the Financial Markets: Money as the Achilles' Heel 
of Terrorism,” 29 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 59, 75 (2007). 
 74. See the Corfu Channel case (United Kingdom v Albania) 1949 I.C.J. 4, 23. 
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A. TERRORISM AND SELF DEFENSE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS 
A question may be posed if Article 51 of the United Nations Charter 
applied to acts of terrorism. In other words, can the provision of Article 
51 be invoked in response to terrorist acts. This provision provides for 
the exercise of the right of self-defense by a State if an armed attack 
occurs. The natural interpretation of Article 51 would be that self-
defense is only appropriate when a State is a victim of an armed attack.75  
“Armed attack” is not defined anywhere in the UN Charter, perhaps 
because its drafters did not see any reason to do so.76  It becomes 
pertinent to determine if terrorism amounts to an armed attack. There is 
no doubt that modern terrorism is committed with arms, and even 
sophisticated weapons.77 
The disposition of the UN lends credence to the view that terrorist acts 
amount to armed attack. This is inferred from the two resolutions passed 
by the Security Council- Resolution 1368 (2001) and Resolution 1373 
(2001), following the September 11th  terrorist attacks against the United 
States, recognizing and reaffirming the inherent right of individual and 
collective self defense contained in the Charter of the United Nations. 
There is no better reading of the Security Council actions than that the 
9/11 terrorist attacks triggered an affirmative right of the United States to 
use force in self-defense.78  Terrorist attacks therefore amount to armed 
attacks for purposes of Article 51.  
However, a more difficult problem is whether the right of self-defense in 
response to terrorist acts is exercisable with respect to terrorism 
committed by non-State actors. Would the State from which territory the 
terrorists operate be responsible for the conduct of the non-State actors? 
This issue goes to the root of State responsibility, and central to a 
determination of such responsibility is the principle of attribution.  
A conservative interpretation of Article 51 would seem to suggest that it 
applies to armed attack by States to the exclusion of non-State actors,79 
  
 75. See the Nicaragua case, supra. 
 76. See Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States,  278 (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1963). 
 77. For a discussion on computer warfare, see Schmit, “Computer Network Attack and the Use 
of Force in International Law Thoughts on a Normative Framework,” 37 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law, 885 (1998-1999). 
 78. See Chris Bordelon, “The Illegality of the U.S. Policy of Preemptive Self Defense Under 
International Law,” Chapman Law Rev. 111, 119 (2005). 
 79. It is for this reason that it has been asserted that the two resolutions passed by the Security 
Council in reaction to the 9/11 attacks have added a completely new element to the concept of self 
defense, one that is not present both in Article  51 and the Nicaragua case examples of armed attack . 
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but this interpretation is expanded by the invocation of the doctrine of 
attribution.80  The attribution principle, which applies the effective control 
test, essentially provides that a State is responsible for the actions of non 
State-actors in its territory if that State had effective control over the non-
State actors.81  Thus, where a State can attribute the activities of non-State 
actors to the State from which territory the terrorist attacks originated, 
that would engage the responsibility of that State.82  A prime example of 
this rule is in the case of United States and Afghanistan. The Taliban 
government provided the needed environment conducive for Al Qaeda to 
execute its terrorist project against the United States and there is 
sufficient literature supporting this view.83  Therefore, in the midst of 
these authorities, an argument to the contrary would surely asphyxiate. 
Furthermore, another ground for attributing responsibility for terrorist 
acts committed by non-State actors to a State is where the State has 
failed, neglected, or refused to prevent its non-State actors from 
committing such terrorist acts on another State, or even where the State 
has lost control over its non-State actors.84   
It is not always easy to establish this nexus between a State and its non-
State actors or a particular terrorist group for the purpose of finding 
responsibility on the part of that State. This results in a State, which has 
been a victim of terrorist attacks by non-State actors, mounting attacks 
on another State that it considers as having sponsored the terrorism. This 
wrong imputation leads to illegal attacks, which can amount to 
aggression. The United States attacks on Iraq in 2003 have been 
condemned in the light of the foregoing analysis. It is largely believed 
that there was no evidence linking Iraq to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.85     
The 2006 Israel-Lebanon crisis presents yet another example where a 
claimed exercise of a right of self-defense against terrorist attacks by 
  
See Maj. Jennifer Bottoms, “When Close Doesn't Count: An Analysis of Israel's Jus Ad Bellum and 
Jus In Bello in the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War,” 2009-APR ARMLAW 23, 38 (2009). 
 80. See Lawrence Azubuike, “Status of Taliban and Al Qaeda Soldiers: Another Viewpoint,” 
19 Conn. J. Int'l L. 127, 139 (2003); Ian Johnstone, “US-UN Relations After Iraq: The End of the 
World (Order) as We Know It?” 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 813,828 (2004). 
 81. See the Nicaragua case, supra, para. 99-100. 
 82. See Allen Weiner, “The Use of Force and Contemporary Security Threats: Old Medicine 
for New Ills,” 59 STAN. L. REV. 415, 431. 
 83. See Allen Weiner, supra, 433; Lawrence Azubuike, supra, 134-136, 140. 
 84. This view seems to be represented in Article 9 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. See G.A. RES. 56/83, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 
10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Supp) (Dec. 12, 2001); Tom Roy, “Crossing the Thin Blue Line: An Inquiry 
into Israel's Recourse to Self Defense Against Hezbollah,” 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 265, 290 (2007). 
 85. See Mahmoud Hmoud, “The Use of Force Against Iraq: Occupation and Security Council 
Resolution 1483,” 36 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 435, 443 (2004); UK Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Seventh Report of Session,200-02, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism, HC, 384, 
para. 215; U. O. Umozurike, supra, 207. 
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non-State actors came into play. While it may appear clear that the 
actions of the Hezbollah guerillas against an Israeli military post 
amounted to use of force, it appears murky if they qualify as armed 
attacks giving rise to the right of self-defense.86  However, the actions of 
Hezbollah attracted condemnation from the international community.87  It 
was not in question that the guerillas operated from Lebanon, but could 
their actions be attributable to the State of Lebanon? It has been asserted 
that not only is Hezbollah a terrorist organization, but also a recognized 
political party in Lebanon, and that no faction in Lebanon is authorized 
by the government to carry arms except Hezbollah.88  If this is the case, 
then Hezbollah’s actions can be attributed to the government of Lebanon. 
Whatever assessment of the situation is to be made, it should not be 
forgotten that prior to the actions of the Hezbollah militants against 
Israel, there had been a rift between Israel and Lebanon.89  Even if it is 
conceded that from the circumstances of the Israel-Lebanon crisis, Israel 
had the right of self-defense, the manner in which Israel exercised such 
right was illegal, considering the human casualties recorded in that 
operation, many of whom were innocent civilians. The attack was 
therefore not proportionate to the raid committed by Hezbollah on the 
Israeli military outpost.   
VI. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND COUNTER 
TERRORISM 
The UN Charter has provisions that make reference to the respect for and 
promotion of human rights,90 but there is no consensus on whether or not 
these provisions confer rights on individuals and whether they are legally 
binding or not.91 Without going into details about the arguments 
surrounding those provisions, suffice it to say that there are now separate 
  
 86. The I.C.J. has ruled that not every use of force amounts to armed attack. See Sean D. 
Murphy, “Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,” 43 
HARV. INT'L L. J., 41, 44 (2002). 
 87. See U.N. Doc. S/PV.5488 (July 13, 2006); U.N. Doc. S/PV.5493 (July 21, 2006). 
 88. See Maj. Jennifer Bottoms, supra, 24. 
 89. See Wilson Lam, Hezbollah, Israel, and the Lessons of 1982, ANGUS REID GLOBAL 
MONITOR, July 26, 2006, available at http://www.angus-
reid.com/analysis/view/hezbollah_israel_and_the_lessons_of_1982/ ;Kathryn Westcott, Who Are 
Hezbollah?, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Apr. 4, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
middle_east/1908671.stm.; Andrea Levin, Death and Destruction are Hezbollah's Goals, B. GLOBE, 
Aug. 8, 2006, available at http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2006/ 
08/08/death_and_destruction_are_hezbollahs_goals. 
 90. See, for example Articles 1(2,3), 13, 55, 56, and 68. 
 91. One school of thought argues that the provisions do not create an obligation on states, and 
that what the provisions confer on individuals are benefits, not rights. See H. Kelsen, The Law of the 
United Nations, 29 (1950); J. G. Starke, International Law, 350 (1984). The other view is that the 
provisions are legally binding on states. See Philip Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations, 91 (1949); 
Ezejiofor, Protection of Human Rights, 113 (1962); Schwelb, “The International Court of Justice and 
the Human Rights Clause of the Charter,” 66 A.J.I.L. 337 (1972). 
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instruments wholly devoted to human rights. First, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948,92  although as a non-
binding General Assembly resolution.93 The Declaration made provisions 
for political and civil rights, and economic, social, and cultural rights.94  
The Declaration has come to be considered as having a great impact on 
human rights.95  
In 1966, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)96 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR)97 were adopted, but they did not enter into 
force until 1976. The two Covenants drew inspiration from the 
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Among other 
provisions, the ICCPR states that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of 
his life,98 and that no one shall be subject to torture99 and arbitrary arrest 
or detention.100 Article 2 provides that State parties undertake to respect 
and ensure the rights provided by the Covenant to individuals are 
guaranteed them within their territories, and subject to the jurisdiction of 
each State. The ICESCR, inter alia, recognizes the right to work,101 and to 
just and favorable working conditions.102 It guarantees the right to form 
and join trade unions103 and to social security.104 It provides for adequate 
food, clothing, and housing,105 and protects the family, mothers, and 
children.106 Under the Covenant, an adequate standard of living is 
  
 92. See G.A. Res. 217 (III), Pt. A (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 93. See Buergenthal, “The Evolving International Human Rights System”, 100 A.J.I.L. 783, 
784-785 (2006); Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights, 408-417 (1950). In the words of 
the United States representative to the UN at the time of the adoption of the Declaration, Eleanor 
Roosevelt: “it is not a treaty; it is not an international agreement. It is not and does not purport to be 
a statement of law or of legal obligation.” See 19 U.S. Dept. of State Bull. 751 (Dec.9, 1948). 
 94. It recognizes the equality of all persons, both in dignity and in rights. It guarantees the right 
to life, liberty and security of all persons. Under the Declaration, torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment; slavery, servitude and slave trade, are all prohibited. It prohibits 
arbitrary arrest and detention, and ensures fair and public hearing, in which the accused person is 
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. Other rights are enshrined in the Declaration. See U. 
O. Umozurike, supra,143-145. 
 95. See Henkin, Human Rights: Ideology and Aspiration, Reality and Prospect, in Realizing 
Human Rights: Moving From Inspiration to Impact (Power and Allison, eds.) 3, 11-12 (2000). 
 96. 999 U.N.S.T. 171, Dec. 16, 1966 (hereinafter, ICCPR). 
 97. 993 U.N.T.S. 3, Dec. 16, 1966 (hereinafter, ICESCR). 
 98. Article 6(1) 
 99. Article 7 
 100. Article 9 
 101. Article 6 
 102. Article 7 
 103. Article 8 
 104. Article 9 
 105. Article 11 
 106. Article 10 
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guaranteed.107 Apart from these human rights documents, there are other 
instruments, including those operating on a regional level that make 
provisions for human rights.108 It is thus evident that, international law 
has much concern, at least theoretically, for the respect and protection of 
human rights.  
It is incontestable that terrorism infringes upon these guaranteed human 
rights.109  It has been asserted that “there is probably not a single human 
right exempt from the impact of terrorism”110 and one would have 
thought or presumed that a move towards countering terrorism would be 
a way of ensuring that those human rights are protected. However, the 
trend of events on the international plane seems to suggest that counter 
terrorism is used in a way that its effects on human rights coincide with 
those of terrorism itself. Any measures, including legislation, adopted 
with a view to combating terrorism, must recognize the importance of 
human rights. The issues of torture, wrongful prosecution, and repression 
seem to be central in a discussion of the counter-terrorism- human rights 
link. It has been asserted that states seem to bask in the belief that as far 
as counter-terrorism is concerned, their actions cannot amount to 
terrorism.111  
A situation where governments infringe on human rights, especially on a 
political ground, in the guise of anti-terrorism, is as condemnable as it is 
appalling. Cardona gives a narrative of how, in El Salvador, the police 
arrested, and even commenced prosecution for terrorism, members of a 
rural organization who had carried out a demonstration in reaction to a 
government's administrative program. The arrest and prosecution were 
even extended to a journalist who was reporting on the demonstration.112 
Another example is in November 2010, when people who were traveling 
for the Thanksgiving celebration around the United States were subjected 
at the airports to a terrorism security check, which entailed the passing of 
some radio-active lights through their bodies. This intrusive security 
check could have some human rights implications.  
  
 107. Article 12. See generally, Eide, Krause & Rosas, Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, 2nd 
rev. ed. (2001). 
 108. See Lori F. Damrosch, et al, International Law: Cases and Materials, Chap. 13 (Minnesota, 
2009). 
 109. See William O'Neill, “Terrorism and Human Rights, in Human Rights, The United Nations 
and the Struggle Against Terrorism,” 1, 3 (International Peace Academy, 2003). 
 110. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm. On Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, 
Terrorism and Human Rights: Progress Report, P. 102, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/31 (June 27, 
2001). 
 111. See  Mirna Cardona, “El Salvador: Repression in the Name of Anti-Terrorism,” 42 
CNLILJ 129,137 (2009). 
 112. Id. at 145-146. 
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Furthermore, some counter-terrorism laws contain provisions that are 
clear violations of human rights.113 There were complaints against the 
United States from the International Committee of the Red Cross 
indicating how the United States military authorities inflicted torture on 
and degrading treatment of Iraqi detainees in the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks.114 There were also arbitrary detention of non-United States 
citizens, secret deportation hearings for persons suspected of having 
connections to terrorism, authorization of military commissions to try 
non-citizens accused of terrorism, and military detention without charge 
or access to counsel of United States citizens considered as “enemy 
combatants.”115  
While observing that terrorist acts constitute serious violations of human 
rights, the immediate past Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi 
Annan recognized the human rights implications of counter terrorism 
measures. He cautioned, “...our responses to terrorism, as well as our 
efforts to thwart it and prevent it should uphold the human rights that 
terrorists aim to destroy...”116  Similarly, the General Assembly's 2004 
resolution on human rights and terrorism recognizes that terrorism is a 
violation of human rights and should be fought in a such a way that 
complies with international norms.117 
In the efforts to combat terrorism, security and human rights have been 
treated as if they were mutually exclusive. This should not be so. 
Essential to the element of security is the protection of human rights at 
all times. Those entrusted with the security of the State and who, with 
that authority, assume the role of fighting terrorism, should not have the 
misguided impression that the rising wave of terrorism warrants fighting 
back with whatever means necessary, including violating human rights in 
the process. Granted, national security is a public concern for public 
benefit, and in some situations, overrides private interest. However, what 
  
 113. For example, Article 8 of El Salvador's Special Law Against Acts of Terrorism prescribes 
a five to ten year jail term to anyone who publicly “justifies terrorism or incites another or others to 
commit any of the crimes listed in the law.”  This could lead to a denial of, and an infringement on, 
the right to freedom of speech. See Mirma Cardona, Id, 139. 
 114. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) on the Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons 
by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq During Arrest, Internment and Interrogation (2004), available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/icrc_report_iraq_feb2004.htm. 
 115. See Human Rights Watch, World Report 2003: United States, 
http:/www.hrw.org/wr2k3/us.html. 
 116. See Press Release, The Secretary General, All Must Work Together to Counter Terrorism, 
Prevent Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Secretary General Says, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/8624-
SC/7680 (Mar. 6, 2003), available at http:/www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sigsm8624.doc.htm. 
 117. See Human Rights and Terrorism, G.A. Res. 59/195, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., preamble, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/195 (2004). 
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constitutes public interest is the sum total of the individuals’ rights. State 
security is ultimately for the benefit of the individuals. Of course, a State 
is an abstraction and does not exist in a vacuum. However, if the 
individuals, the ultimate beneficiaries of public security and security 
from terrorism, are subjected to violations of their rights due to counter-
terrorism, then comparable to the evils of terrorism, a vicious cycle of 
violence will have been established. Therefore, whatever effort is geared 
towards combating terrorism should make the issue of the protection of 
human rights its prime consideration. 
VII. EFFORTS AT FIGHTING TERRORISM: UN COUNTER-
TERRORISM MEASURES 
Some measures have been initiated by the UN to combat terrorism. 
Numerous international conventions and other instruments have been 
adopted to fight terrorism, but it remains to be seen if these initiatives 
have really produced tangible results. In 2004, the former UN Secretary-
General, Kofi Annan, constituted the High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges, and Change118  to address the issue of international threat and 
security. Part of the Panel’s recommendations on terrorism included a 
proposed definition of terrorism and a comprehensive global strategy for 
combating it. In this regard, efforts are to be made at reversing the causes 
and facilitators of terrorism by the promotion of social and political 
rights, the rule of law, and democratic reform. The United Nations 
should also address major political grievances. Included in the 
recommendations is the need for the United Nations to develop better 
instruments for global counter-terrorism cooperation, which would 
equally respect civil liberties and human rights.  
As a follow-up to the Panel’s recommendations, the Secretary-General, 
Kofi Annan, in his keynote address at the International Summit on 
Democracy, Terrorism, and Security on March 10, 2005, recognized and 
included those recommendations in his plan of action.119  In 2005, the 
General Assembly adopted a Global Counter-terrorism Strategy,120 which 
  
 118. See Kofi Annan, Foreword to Secretary -General's High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges & Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility VIII (2004), available at 
http:/www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf. 
 119. These include: efforts to deter the disaffected from using terrorism as a means of achieving 
their goals; to deprive terrorists of the means to carry out their attacks; to dissuade states from 
supporting terrorists; to develop the capacity of states to prevent terrorism; and to protect human 
rights in the fight against terrorism. See Kofi Annan, The Secretary-General, United Nations, A 
Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism, Keynote Address to the Closing Plenary of the International 
Summit for Democracy, Terrorism and Security (Mar. 10, 2005), available at http:/english.safe-
democracy.org/keynotes/a-global-strategy-for-fighting-terrorism.html. 
 120. UN Action to Counter Terrorism, http:// www.un.org/terrorism/strategy-counter-
terrorism.html. 
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required every state to implement and fully cooperate with all General 
Assembly and Security Council resolutions aimed at combating 
terrorism. The strategy also required states to address the conditions 
conducive to the spread of terrorism, to undertake measures to prevent 
and combat terrorism, and to ensure respect for human rights for all and 
the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism. 
States are encouraged, under the Strategy, to contribute to measures 
strengthening the role of the United Nations towards fighting terrorism.121  
International organizations also contribute to countering terrorism. The 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund have intensified their 
initiatives on anti-money laundering and combating the financing of 
terrorism.122 These initiatives have been taken in recognition of the fact 
that money laundering is a means of financing terrorism. These measures 
still need to be supported with other efforts from all quarters of the 
international community in order to achieve the set objectives. 
A. HOW BEST TO COMBAT TERRORISM (CURING THE UNDERLYING 
PROBLEM) 
The fact that terrorism still persists despite the efforts made to combat it 
is perhaps a revelation of the inadequacy of those measures. It also 
underscores the need for a more viable, results-oriented approach to 
solving the problem of terrorism. There remains the great need to find 
the right causes of the underlying problems and not just focus on their 
symptoms.   The United Nations Organization has been on the forefront, 
without success, to come up with a universal and comprehensive 
definition of terrorism. This definition would serve as a yardstick against 
which violent actions would be gauged to determine whether or not they 
amount to terrorism.  
For more than fourteen years, the United Nations has battled with this 
task through committee work, resolutions, and calls for concerted State 
actions to fight the problem.  The inability of States to adopt a 
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, which would 
provide an adequate definition of terrorism owing to unnecessary 
parochial interest, should be deprecated.  
Solving the problem of terrorism calls for a multidimensional approach 
and does not lie in using only military action, which can only cure the 
  
 121. UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, G.A. Res. 60/288, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. 
A/Res/60/288/Annex (Sept. 8, 2005). 
 122. See Matthew Levitt, Iraq, U.S., and the War on Terror, Stemming the Flow of Terrorist 
Financing: Practical and Conceptual Challenges, 27 SPG FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 59 (2003). 
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symptoms of terrorism – the outward manifestation – and not the 
problem itself. It is one thing to recognize the need to tackle terrorism 
using a complex approach – as the UN has observed in the 
recommendations of the High-level panel – and it is another thing to take 
bold steps in the direction of combating terrorism. There is a need for a 
change in the way people perceive terrorism. This change can be 
achieved by campaign, both at the grassroots and upper levels. This 
change is where the role of NGOs and other international organizations 
becomes indispensable. This paper places much premium on this 
approach. 
Having found a link between politics and terrorism, it becomes crucial 
that those who control the machinery of government should be 
committed to democracy. A periodic election is a necessary tool for 
achieving democracy. It is time leaders discarded the idea of clinging to 
power at the displeasure of the governed. The recent happenings in Egypt 
are still fresh in our minds, and those of Libya are even fresher. They are 
the conditions that breed terrorism, especially when the individuals feel 
that the government is being supported by a foreign State.  
Governments and financial institutions should be more vigilant over, and 
where necessary, place stricter monitoring, on the transfer of funds. To 
the extent permissible by international law, states should be more 
cautious in the area of international trade, so as not to allow the 
movement of arms, which can be used for terrorist purposes. There is a 
need for promotion of international cooperation in criminal matters, 
especially as it pertains to terrorism. Criminal sanctions still have a 
deterrent purpose, in spite of whatever objections trail its application. 
States and individuals should see themselves as stakeholders in the task 
of combating terrorism. 
Above all, counter terrorism should not be divorced from human rights; 
rather, both are complementary and should be adopted in the cause 
against terrorism. Anything to the contrary would lead to abuse and 
denial of human rights, which would have a negative impact on the task 
at hand. In fact, the efforts at combating terrorism should be given a 
human rights approach. Human rights bodies should increase their 
participation and should liaise with other stakeholders to achieve a 
terrorism-free international community. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
It is important to emphasize one thing: the position of this paper has not 
been to write off the efforts so far made by the international community, 
especially the United Nations, toward combating terrorism. Rather, this 
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paper calls for more activism on the part of States, individuals, and 
international organizations for their commitment in the cause against 
terrorism. Until this is done, “uhuru,” (which means “freedom” in 
Swahili) does not exist and only then can the international community go 
ahead and beat its chest that it has won the war against terrorism. 
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